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Pearsonian Peacekeeping: Does It Have a Future
or Only a Past?
by
Alex Morrison
As the title of my talk is posed as a question, “Pearsonian Peacekeeping:
Does it Have a Future or Only a Past?,” let me answer the question immediately
and then proceed to explain why I believe my answer to be the correct one.  My
contention is that Pearsonian peacekeeping has a future because it has a past.
Lester Pearson’s principles and practices, his ideals and his acceptance of the
realities of life all combined in the autumn of 1956 in his invention of peace-
keeping.  Since that time, the efforts of military and civilian peacekeepers have
combined to accomplish the true aim of peacekeeping: the saving of lives and the
alleviation of human suffering.
Mr. Pearson’s work at that time, its embrace by Canadians and by the
world, have resulted in the saving of many hundreds of thousands of lives – the
exact number can only be guessed.  Canadians have enormous pride in peace-
keeping. A recent public opinion poll commissioned by the Pearson
Peacekeeping Centre indicates that an overwhelming majority of Canadians
agree and also that we should continue to share our experience and expertise.1
Long an admirer of Lester Pearson, his ideas, his goals and his practical
results, I retain sharp and vivid memories of what assuredly were fleeting asso-
ciations but which have acquired a length and permanence in direct ratio to the
distance in time of their occurrences.  Many were gained in Ottawa conventions,
in public speaking competitions and in University and Federal election cam-
paigns.  His kindness and affable manner which immediately put one at ease will
always be remembered.
During the last six years of my military career 1983-89, which were spent
as a member of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in New
York, I met many UN international civil servants and national politicians and
diplomats who worked with Mr. Pearson during the time he spent at the UN in
many capacities, including that of President of the General Assembly and during
those dark days of the autumn of 1956 when he suggested a UN force be used to
solve the Suez Crisis.  His invention of peacekeeping at that time and the subse-
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quent bestowal upon him of the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize have ensured that ever
since Canada and peacekeeping have been synonymous throughout the world.
Let me illustrate my point of view by using some of Mr. Pearson’s words,
and setting his view that what he brought about in the latter months of 1956
would be merely transitory unless concrete follow-up actions were taken.  He
saw that peacekeeping had great potential but knew that much work had to be
accomplished for that potential to be realized.  In his acceptance speech upon
presentation of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway early in December 1957,
in reference to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force
(referred to initially as UNEF, then, after the second force was set up in the same
area later, as UNEF I) he said, “We did, however, take at least a step in the direc-
tion of putting international force behind an international decision a year ago in
the Suez Crisis . . . We made at least a beginning then.  If, on that foundation we
do not build something more permanent and stronger, we will once again have
ignored realities, rejected opportunities and betrayed our trust.  Will we never
learn?”
Previously, in the journal, Foreign Affairs, in a 1957 article entitled “Force
for U.N.,” he contended that:
The world’s alarm last November over events in Egypt – intensified,
if that were possible, by the frustrating situation in Hungary – galva-
nized the General Assembly into establishing a United Nations
Emergency Force, an action which until then had not been thought
practicable or probable.  We must now do everything possible to
ensure that this action is successful in achieving the desired results.
If we fail in this, a damaging blow – perhaps a fatal one – will be
dealt to the whole concept of supervising the peace and avoiding
hostilities through the United Nations Assembly.  If we succeed, then
we must build on that success so that when we are faced in the future
with similarly complicated and dangerous situations we can avoid
the hasty improvisations of last autumn.2
Writing in Maclean’s magazine in May 1964, he reviewed the actions (or
non-actions) of the League of Nations at the time of the Abyssinian Crisis in the
mid-1930s.  (It was during the diplomatic discussions in Geneva at that time that
Senator Raoul Dandurand made the now-famous statement about Canada being
a “fire-proof house.”) Mr. Pearson’s laments that this initial attempt at putting
together “an international police force” failed when individual members of the
League refused to seize the opportunity.  After reference to the founding of the
United Nations in San Francisco in the late summer of 1945, he turned to the
Suez Crisis and UNEF I and stated, “There was no precedent for this kind of
police-and-peace action . . . UNEF was a heartening experience in restoring and
preserving peace by international action.”3
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UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim had this to say about Mr. Pearson:
“It is always tempting to speculate on how a statesman from the recent past
would have reacted to our present problems.  In Pearson’s case it is especially
tempting, for his wisdom, objectivity, and far-sightedness were famous even in
his lifetime.  To give only one example, now more relevant than ever, during the
Suez Crisis in 1956, he insisted that a mere cease-fire and withdrawal were not
enough. ‘What is the use,’ he asked,
of passing a resolution which brings about a cease-fire and even a
withdrawal? . . . In six months we’ll go through all this again if we
do not take advantage of this crisis to pluck something out . . . if we
do not take advantage to do something about a political settlement,
we will regret it.  The time has come for the UN not only to bring
about a cease-fire, but to move in and police the cease-fire and make
arrangements for a political settlement.
Lester Pearson’s whole life and career were devoted to serving his country
and the wider international community.  He served in the First World War (where
he received the nickname “Mike” when his flying instructor decided that
“Lester” was not a fit name for a pilot), was a professor at the University of
Toronto, joined the Department of External Affairs, was at the Canadian High
Commission in London during the Blitz, became the Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, and then made the move to political life.
While wishing that the use of force to settle international crises could be
abolished, he was practical-minded enough to accept – and advocate – that force-
ful means will be needed, from time to time, to be employed for the common
good.  John Holmes, that elegant, extremely-talented and ever so diplomatic
Canadian diplomat, in The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the search for world
order 1943-1957, volume 2 of his absolutely pre-eminent trio of books on
Canada in the international arena, described Mr. Pearson during the days in New
York when Canada was playing a/the leading role in attempting to defuse the
Suez Crisis.  He writes:
Pearson’s tactic was simple but brilliantly played.  He had the men-
tal as well as the physical power of an athlete.  His role was that of
quarterback, inventing plays and giving signals, shifting his ground
to take advantage of openings and exploiting adversity pour mieux
sauter.  His vast experience and his nimble grasp of essentials gave
him the necessary confidence, and his own assurance under pressure
inspired the confidence of others – although even his own advisers
were sometimes bewildered by the mobility of his tactics.  
Holmes continued:
He made no speech in the debate, abstained, and then rose to explain
his abstention.  He made no judgements except to regret that force
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had been used in the circumstances.  His approach was ruthlessly
pragmatic.  He did not disagree with the proposal for ceasefire and
withdrawal but thought that the resolution did not go far enough; the
opportunity should be taken to link a ceasefire to the absolute neces-
sity of a political settlement in Palestine and for Suez.  Then fol-
lowed one of the most potent conditional sentences in UN history.  ‘I
therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution . . .
authorising the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements
with member governments for a United Nations force large enough
to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being
worked out.’4
Later in the book he says that, “Pearson’s footwork in the early stages of the cri-
sis had been dazzling.  Quarterback, tight-rope walker, he became also a brilliant
choreographer, scenarist, or stage-manager, in partnership with Hammarskjöld
. . . and others . . ..”5
Much earlier in his political career in an address to the Canadian Bar
Association on 31 March 1951, Pearson asked: “What should we do if the main
aggressor should exploit the provisions of the Charter for the maintenance of the
peace everywhere, in order to weaken us so that one day the peace cannot be
maintained anywhere?  What can we do to prevent the principle of collective
security being used to weaken collective security in practice?”  He offered four
principles as a solution to these questions:
a) “In every situation, our obligation under the Charter to do whatever we
can to maintain the principle of collective security should be dis-
charged.  In other words, we must recognize unprovoked aggression,
whether committed by great or small powers, for what it is, and take
appropriate action.  This action may have to vary, however, according
to circumstances.”
b) “We should never formally condemn an aggressor until the fact of his
aggression is clearly proven by impartial evidence, and until the medi-
atory and conciliatory functions of the United Nations have been
exhausted.”
c) “Commendation of aggression should not mean that in every case eco-
nomic and military sanctions must follow.  The enforcement action to
be taken against an aggressor must be related to the practicability of
such action; to the general strategic and political situation, and to the
possibility of such enforcement action weakening the peaceful and law
abiding powers in other areas, thereby tempting another and a far more
serious threat to the peace.”
d) “We should recognize our limitations in this way, even when condem-
natory action has to be taken.  There is nothing immoral in this.  It is
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immoral, however, when passing resolutions at the United Nations con-
demning aggressors, to give the impression that they will be followed
by strong and effective economic and military action, when we know
that, in fact, such action will not or cannot be taken.  It was not, for
instance, the reluctance of the League of Nations to condemn the
aggression of Fascist Italy against Abyssinia, which so fatally weakened
that organization.  That condemnation was easy and it was given in ring-
ing and defiant resolutions and speeches.  The wrong done was in giv-
ing the impression that these resolutions would be implemented, and
then doing nothing about it.”6
What then are the essential words/terms to describe Pearsonian peace-
keeping?  Let me suggest a few:
• Individual actions, while dealing with the immediate situation at hand,
must be a foundation for future, similar actions in the military and polit-
ical arenas.  We must always look where we want to be.
• Force is to be used when necessary and in sufficient strength to deal with
the situation at hand but also strong enough to serve as a deterrent.
• Planning, preparation and partnership preventative measures are essen-
tial.
• The United Nations must be the organization of choice of the interna-
tional community to deal with the threat of or actuality of conflict.
In his Maclean’s article, Mr. Pearson asked, “How can we, within the UN,
use the experience we have gained in these actions to improve our future efforts
to keep the peace?”7 I might also, parenthetically, point out his use of the phrase
“to keep the peace.”  It is apparent to me from his writing that he understood
clearly that “keeping the peace” was a multi-faceted, wide spectrum activity.  Not
for him the contemporary hair-splitting which concentrates more on semantics
than results.  He went on to list six “basic principles of action and organization
. . . to be worked out in advance and accepted (by the UN).” 
• “Advance planning and organization” to ensure orderly processes and
actions in the establishment, organization, deployment and employment
of a peacekeeping force.
• A UN force should have clear terms of reference.
• There should be a “permanent, military-planning-and-staff group in the
secretary-general’s office . . ..”
• Peacekeeping should be financed by the UN as a whole, not only by par-
ticipating states or voluntary contributions.
• Sharing of peacekeeping experience and ideas.
Spring 2003
10
• And, later in the article, groups of UN Member States should organize a
force outside the UN – ready to use if the UN asks.  The force should be
well trained and equipped, and composed of middle power states.8
Mr. Pearson’s eye was always on the future.  He knew that awareness of the pres-
ent is important but that it must be a foundation for the future.
How are his suggestions being implemented, if at all?  Let me refer to the
August 2000 Brahimi Report commissioned by UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan in March of that year.9 It is a remarkable document.  It is clear, concise
and outlines what must be done to make peacekeeping professional and profi-
cient.  It talks about professionalism, training, organization of UN military staff,
financing of peacekeeping operations, terms of reference, sharing of lessons
learned – all of Pearson’s points.  It almost seems as if Mr. Pearson was a mem-
ber of the Brahimi panel.  Much has been done to implement Pearson’s sugges-
tions.  Much more will be done by the UN, national governments and by the
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.
CONCLUSION
Lester Pearson invented peacekeeping as it is practiced today.  That inven-
tion and its importance to national and international peace, security and stability
were recognized by the awarding of the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize.  He knew and
acknowledged that UNEF I was a start, a foundation on which to build for the
future.  He knew it would be changed, developed, enhanced.  
There are four certainties about the future of peacekeeping:
• It will remain the instrument of choice for conflict prevention and reso-
lution.
• Mechanisms and modalities of the past will be used in the future.
• New methods will be required.
• Flexibility and positive attitude are key attributes.
Each recognizes a debt to Mr. Pearson.
Pearsonian peacekeeping certainly does have a future.  In his 1957 Foreign
Affairs article, Mr. Pearson wrote:
As always, in the last resort, individual governments must determine
whether the best laid plans of the United Nations are to succeed or
fail.  If a plan anything like that which I have outlined is to succeed,
governments must, both within and outside the United Nations, fol-
low policies consistent with its objectives and its capabilities.  The
very least each of our governments can now do, it seems to me, is to
draft, in accordance with our respective constitutional processes,
whatever measures are required to place us in a better position to
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support agreed decisions of the United Nations in an emergency.  Are
we to go on from crisis to crisis improvising in haste?  Or can we
now pool our experience and our resources, so that the next time we,
the governments and peoples whom the United Nations represents,
will be ready and prepared to act?”10
Let me conclude with another Pearsonian quote: “The time has come for
us to make a move, not only from strength, but from wisdom and from confi-
dence in ourselves; to concentrate on the possibilities of agreement, rather than
on the disagreements and failures, the evil and wrongs, of the past.”  We must
continue to follow the path set out for us by Mr. Pearson that autumn of 1956.
To do less would be a disservice to him, his ideas and the values of peacekeep-
ing.
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